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Abstract 
In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory 
model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display 
multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are 
evolutionary stable equilibria in the game theory evolutionary set up. In this vein a 
complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labor market 
is provided.  
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1. Introduction 
In the present paper the dynamics of the labor market is studied by using an 
evolutionary game theory approach. The starting point is the model developed by 
Araujo and Souza (2010) who departing from a microeconomic point of view of agents’ 
choice making and going through a macroeconomic assessment of formal and informal 
sectors behaviors delineate optimal policies that foresee the trade-off between tax 
collecting and incentive creation to workers and firms to operate in the formal sector.  
In fact there are a number of papers acknowledging that there is a 
correspondence between the labor market and the stage of economic development [see 
Acemoglu (1998, 2002)]. Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), for instance, maintain that 
the adoption of technical change requires equally specific human capital in addition to 
physical capital, and an increase in labor skills facilitates the adoption of new 
technologies. Hendricks (2000) models growth through technology adoption focusing 
on the complementariness between technologies and skills. Workers’ skills and 
technological profile of firms are therefore complementary: the level of the former 
limits the profile of technologies that firms can use, while this latter determines the rate 
of learning. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), focusing on the role of human capital in 
economic development suggest that the role of the former is to facilitate the adoption of 
technology from abroad and at the same time, to create a domestic technology. 
Hence, there exists a consensus that the presence of skilled workers implies a 
better environment for skill-complementary technologies, and it encourages further 
upgrading of productivity of skilled workers. On one hand, firms operating in a labor 
market thickly populated by high skilled workers may choose a better technological 
profile to match those skills. On the other hand, workers in an environment in which 
firms demand high skilled workers, find incentives to improve their skills. This view is 
3 
 
supported by a number of authors. Snower (1994), for instance, shows how a country 
can fall into a "low-skill, bad-job trap," characterized by a vicious cycle of low 
productivity, deficient training, and low-skilled jobs, preventing the economy from 
competing effectively in the markets for skill-intensive products. Redding (1996) also 
points to the existence of a low growth trap in which a large proportion of the workforce 
is unskilled, firms have little incentive to provide good jobs (requiring high skills and 
providing high wages), and if few good jobs are available, workers have little incentive 
to acquire skills. 
Following this rationale, Lavezzi (2006) have emphasized the role of skill 
resources as a crucial constraint on the selection of the technological profile to be 
implemented in developing economies. This author focuses on the dynamics of human 
capital accumulation (framed by a Markov chain) where human capital accumulation 
and technology adoption are interrelated processes. For workers the crucial issue is the 
type of firms they interact with, and likewise for firms it is the type of workers they 
hire. In high-skill equilibrium, for example, workers expect firms to invest in 
technology and then invest in human capital. Thus, firms find it optimal to invest, and 
therefore expectations are fulfilled in equilibrium. 
The connection between skills and formality, which is one of assumptions of the 
present paper, was addressed by Rausch (1991) in a model in which agents with highest 
ability become formal managers. Managers with more ability would naturally run larger 
firms and employ more capital; for this reason they choose to join the formal sector, 
where they face a lower cost of capital and do not face limits on capital deployment. 
Hence in this model limited access to capital goods is not the only constraint that firms 
and workers face when they decide for the informal sector. 
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Fortin et al (1997) have developed a model with firm heterogeneity in which a 
formal and an informal economy emerge in some sectors as the optimal response of the 
effects of taxation and wage controls. In their model the segmentation of the labor 
market accrue from the fact that the marginal cost of tax evasion increases with the size 
of the firm.  Following this approach Mattos and Ogura (2008) have concluded that in 
the same industry more efficient firms tend to be formal while the less efficient ones are 
informal. They assumed that the cost of informality increases with production, and this 
implies that formal firms have a greater probability of employing high-skilled workers. 
One of the main results of their model is that the formality choices by firms determine 
the allocation of workers between formal and informal sectors1.  
Following this investigation, Straub (2005) analyzes the formality decision in a 
continuous investment model with moral hazard. The model builds on a dual credit 
market structure, in which the basic assumption is that ex post income is verifiable for 
formal lenders but not for informal ones. By introducing a cost of entry into formality, it 
then gives simple predictions linking the decision of each entrepreneur to become 
formal or not to the amount of available initial capital, the relative efficiency of credit 
markets and the cost of registering formally. Moreover, the author examines how the 
trade-off is affected by the possibility to attach collateral, a more or less efficient 
judicial recovery of loans, the volatility of the economic environment and the existence 
of labor rigidities like minimum wage requirements or dismissal costs. 
                                                      
1 In the present paper the determination is simultaneous, namely the choice of the firms affects and it is 
affected by the decision of workers.   
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Loayza and Rigolini2 (2006) have found that the size of informal employment is 
given by the proportion of workers whose skills fall below a threshold level where the 
worker is indifferent between the two sectors. According to them informality not only 
responds to fundamental, long-run forces but also to inter-temporal economic conditions 
related to the business cycle and transient policies. Thus, for example, the informal 
sector could act as a buffer that expands in economic recessions or as an adjustment 
mechanism during temporarily high tax regimes.  
Fiess et al. (2010) have developed a labor market model and embedded it in a 
standard macroeconomic framework that allows capturing additional information on the 
sectoral origin of the shocks through the real exchange rate — a measure of relative 
prices of tradable and non tradable. Their findings suggest that the pro or counter 
cyclicality behavior of the informal sector is more complex than what was reported by 
Loayza and Rigolini (2006) since it depends on the sectoral origin of the shocks, and the 
presence of binding wage rigidities. They have found numerous examples where either 
a positive productivity or demand shock to the non tradable/informal sector leads to its 
expansion. 
In this paper we intend to provide a characterization of the dynamics of the labor 
market by studying the stability of an evolutionary game theory model of the labor 
market presented by Araujo and Souza (2010) by using the Lyapunov method. 
Following this approach our study consider that workers and firms’ decision to engage 
                                                      
2 Other papers that investigate causes and determinants of informality include Loayza (1996), Loayza et 
al (2005a, 2005b) and Maloney (2004). All of them point to some positive relation between the size of the 
informal sector and higher taxes, more labor market restrictions, and poorer institutions (bureaucracy, 
corruption and legal environment). 
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in the formal or informal sector3 as the outcome of rational decisions based not only on 
the expected pay-offs in each of the sectors but also on the interaction with other agents. 
In this vein our framework is similar to the search and matching models but with the 
advantage of endogenizing the probabilities of matching between firms and workers.  
In this vein the model presented here accommodates a varied growth experience 
of both developed and less developed economies, in which both technological adoption 
and labor skills play a crucial role in the determination of the stage of the labor market 
in an evolutionary dynamic framework. We conclude that when profits in the formal 
and informal sectors are positive the final outcome of the interplay between skills and 
technologies is dependent upon the economy’s initial conditions, akin to the path 
dependence. This paper is structured as follows: in the next section we present the 
model with its main properties. In section 2 we present the model and in section 3 we 
study the local stability.  Lyapunov stability of a reduced version of the model in which 
wages are exogenous is studied in section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The Evolutionary Model 
The model departs from Araujo and Souza (2010) and corresponds to an 
asymmetric evolutionary game where there are two populations of interacting agents 
[See Gintis (2000)]: workers and firms. It is assumed that each identical worker has two 
possible strategies that is, supply labour in either formal or informal market at each 
period of time. Let N be the number of workers, Nf   the number of workers that choose 
to supply labour in the formal sector – the formal strategy – and Ni be the number of 
                                                      
3 It is important to bear in mind that in this paper we do not view informality as the result of exclusion but 
rather as the outcome of rational decisions by firms and workers [see Hirschman (1970)]. 
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workers that choose the informal sector – the informal strategy. Let fn  and in  be the 
proportions of workers that chooses the formal and informal strategies respectively, 
with 1=+ fi nn . By choosing a strategy does not mean that the worker will be 
employed since to be hired it depends on matching a firm that has chosen the same 
strategy. Otherwise the worker will be unemployed. If she chooses the formal strategy 
then there exists a probability σ, 10 ≤≤σ , of finding a job in a formal firm. In this vein 
her instantaneous expected utility, efU , is assumed to be given by:   
)0()1(])1[( uwuU f
e
f στσ −+−=                                        (1) 
Where (.)u  is a concave utility function, and fw  is the real wage discounted by 
the income tax τ , 10 <<τ . Expression (1) shows that if the worker chooses the formal 
strategy there is no probability of punishment but she faces uncertainty related to 
finding or not a firm that also chooses the formal strategy to hire her, what happens with 
probabilityσ . By assuming that u(0) = 0 expression (1) reduces to: 
])1[( f
e
f wuU τσ −=                                                     (1)’ 
However, if the worker decides to act in the informal sector his expected utility, 
e
i
U , is given by4:  
)]()1[( mwwuU ii
e
i
−+−= ρρφ                                              (2) 
                                                      
4 An important difference between this approach and the one developed by Fortin et al (1997) is that in 
our model we model explicitly the possibility of being caught due to the operation in the informal sector 
while they consider that the firm in the informal sector faces a cost in order to avoid to be caught. The 
insight is that the higher the production of the firm the higher the cost in order to conceal its production. 
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Where  , 10 ≤≤φ , is the probability of finding a job in the informal sector and iw  is 
the wage paid in the informal sector. The probability of being caught due to the 
operation in the informal sector is given by  ρ, 10 ≤≤ ρ  . In this case the worker pays a 
fine, denoted by m, due to the choice of acting in the informal sector. These variables 
are assumed to be exogenous. Expression (2) shows that the worker who chooses the 
informal strategy faces two kinds of uncertainty: the first is related to the possibility of 
not finding a firm that chooses the informal strategy and the second is related to the 
possibility of being caught if hired by an informal firm. This expression may be 
rewritten as: 
][ mwuU i
e
i
ρφ −=                                                          (2)’ 
In order to model the demand side of the labour market, let us assume following 
the literature of search and matching – see e.g. Pissarides (2000) – that the number of 
firms, denoted by L, is equal to the number of workers5, that is L = N. Let Lf be the 
number of firms that chooses the formal strategy and Li the number of firms that 
chooses the informal strategy. Analogous to the case of labour supply, each firm can 
demand labour in only one of the markets in each period of time. Let iη  be the 
proportion of firms that chooses the informal strategy and fη , the proportion of firms 
that chooses the formal strategy, with 1=+ fi ηη .  
Following Pissarides (2000) assume that each firm hires only one worker who 
produces a fixed amount of product at a time. The price of the product is normalized to 
                                                      
5 This is a usual assumption in the search and matching models and here it is adopted for tractability only. 
For a treatment of the labor market dynamics by using an evolutionary model in which the processes of 
vacancy setting is modeled through a process of searching and matching see Fagiolo et al (2004). 
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1 and the amount of production in the formal sector is exogenously given by yf. Being θ, 
10 ≤≤θ  the probability of a firm that chooses the formal sector to find a worker that 
decides to supply labour in this sector, the profit of the firm if it decides to operate in 
the formal sector is given by: 
])1[( ff
e
f wy −−=∏ γθ                                                   (3) 
Whereγ , 0 < γ < 1, stands for the costs for being in the formal sector. Expression (3) 
shows that each firm has to pay fyγ  as taxes. Both fy  and γ  are assumed to be 
exogenous. If there is no matching between the formal worker and the formal firm then 
the profit of the firm is equal to zero, what occurs with a probability 1 – θ. In the 
informal sector the firm is also assumed to hire only one worker, but now it produces a 
smaller amount of product than in the formal operation due to limited access to public 
goods, capital goods etc. Let yi be the amount of product in informal operation, with yi < 
yf. In this vein the profit of the firm in the informal sector is given by: 
( )[ ] [ ]{ }ewywy iiiiei −−+−−=∏ ψψλ 1                                     (4) 
Where λ, 10 ≤≤ λ is the probability of matching a worker in the informal sector,  and 
ψ , 10 ≤≤ψ , is the probability6 that the firm faces of paying a fine, expressed  by e, 
due to the operation in the informal labour market. After some algebraic manipulations 
expression (4) yields:  
)( ewy ii
e
i
ψλ −−=∏                                                      (5) 
Since it is assumed that each firm hires only one worker the ratio of labour 
demanded in the formal sector, fη , and the ratio of labour demanded in the informal 
                                                      
6 We assume that this probability is the same of finding a worker in the informal sector. This assumption 
is made for the sake of convenience only but it expresses the fact that once a worker in the informal sector 
is detected then the corresponding firm is also found.  
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sector, iη , is proportional to the amount of firms in each sector. It is important to recall 
that if a worker who chooses the formal strategy does not match a firm with this 
strategy – an informal firm – then the pay-off of both worker and firm will be equal to 
zero. In this case the firm is assumed to produce zero output and the worker does not 
earn wage. This situation can be identified as unemployment from the viewpoint of the 
worker. We could assume alternatively that if a worker that chooses the formal sector 
matches a firm in the informal sector then both will obtain positive pay-offs but smaller 
than the pay-offs if both worker and firm choose the formal sector or informal sector 
simultaneously. It is easy to see that this game has two pure Nash equilibria namely 
{f,f} and {i,i} together with a mixed strategy equilibrium, in which both workers and 
firms randomly choose between being formal or informal.  
In order to evaluate the dynamics of entrance and withdrawal of workers in the 
formal market we use a version of the dynamic replicator as proposed by Hofbauer and 
Sigmund (2003) adapted to the study of the labour market according to Araujo and 
Souza (2010). The dynamic movement of workers between the two strategies, namely 
formal and informal is given by the following expressions:   
[ ]ifeff UUNN f ,−=&                        (6) 
[ ]ifeii UUNN i ,−=&                                                           (7) 
Where ifU ,  is the average pay-off given by: 
e
ii
e
ffif UnUnU +=, . By 
inserting expressions (1) and (2) into (6) and (7) it is possible to show after some 
algebraic manipulation7 that it yields the following equations for the dynamic 
behaviour of the ratios of workers in the formal and informal sectors. 
[ ]{ }mwuwunnn ififf ρφτσ −−−= ])1[(&                                  (8) 
                                                      
7 See Araujo and Souza (2010) for the derivation of expressions (8) and (9) from (3) and (4). 
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[ ]{ }])1[( fiifi wumwunnn τσρφ −−−=&                                   (9) 
These expressions show that the central planner can affect the supply of the 
labour in each sector by choosing the taxation, τ, the probability of caught the worker in 
the informal sector, ρ , and the fine to be paid in the informal sector, m. Until this point 
of the analysis the values of σ and  are exogenously considered but a further inquire 
on this probabilities by using a Bayesian inference may show that  fησ = and 
fηφ −=1 . Remember that firms have only two strategies, namely formal and informal. 
Even in the case where there is no matching between a firm choosing the formal 
strategy and a worker choosing the informal strategy their strategies are ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ despite the fact that the worker will be unemployed and the firm will produce 
nothing in that period of time. Hence all firms can be grouped into one of these 
categories: ‘formal’ or ‘informal’. The probability that a worker faces of finding a 
‘formal’ firm is given by f
f
L
L
ησ ==  and the probability of finding a ‘informal’ firm is 
given by i
i
L
L ηφ == . Hence expression (8) may be rewritten as: 
[ ]{ }mwuwunnn ifffiff ρητη −−−−= )1(])1[(&                              (8)’ 
Following the same approach for the labour demand, the dynamic replicators for 
the firms are given by: 
 ( )ifefff LL ,Π−Π=&                                                   (10) 
( )ifeiii LL ,Π−Π=&                                                    (11) 
Where efΠ stands for the expected profit of the formal extrategy and 
e
iΠ  stands for the 
expected profit of the informal extrategy and if ,∏  represents the average expected 
profit in the economy which is the average payoff for firms, given by: 
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e
ii
e
ffif Π+Π=∏ ηη, . By replacing expressions (4) and (5) into expressions above and 
considering that 1 =+ fi ηη  we obtain the following dynamic replicator in the simplex 
form: 
{ }][])1[( ewywy iiffiff ψλγθηηη −−−−−=&                              (12) 
{ }])1[(][ ffiifii wymwy −−−−−= γθρληηη&                              (13) 
By following the same rationale adopted for the labor supply it is possible to 
conclude that fn=θ  and fn−=1λ . Expression (12) may then be rewritten as: 
{ }])[1(])1[( ewynwyn iiffffiff ψγηηη −−−−−−=&                         (12)’ 
In the next section we analyze the steady state equilibria from the system formed 
by expressions (8), (9), (12) and (13). Firstly an assessment of the local stability is made 
and then propositions concerning the Lyapunov stability are presented. 
 
3. Stability 
According to Vega-Redondo (1996, p. 50), a singular point x* of a dynamic 
system is an asymptotically stable equilibrium of it if: 
I) There exists some neighborhood V of x* such that all trajectories starting in V satisfy  
*)( xtx → as ∞→t . 
II) It is Lyapunov stable, i.e. given any neighbourhood U1 of x* there exists another 
neighborhood U2 of x* such that all trajectories with x(0) є U2 satisfy x(t) є U1, 0>∀t . 
One of aims this section is to prove that points (0,0) and (1,1) are asymptotically 
stable equilibria of dynamical system (8)’ and (12)’. In order to accomplish this task it 
is necessary to prove the Lyapunov stability of these points. The method used to prove 
this is the Lyapunov who consists in finding a function that satisfies the conditions of 
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the Lyapunov theorem. This theorem requires the existence of an open neighborhood of  
),( ffn η , namely Ω, with the following properties [See Gintis (2000)]: 
a)  0),( =ffnV η ; 
b)  0),( >ffnV η , for all Ω∈),( ffn η ; 
c) 0),( ≤ffndt
dV η , for all Ω∈),( ffn η . 
If these conditions are met the equilibrium is Lyapunov stable in Ω. In order to 
classify the equilibrium points of system formed by expressions (8)-(9) and (12)-(13) it 
is useful to remember that 1=+ if ηη  and 1=+ if nn and, hence it is not necessary to 
consider explicitly expressions (9) and (13). Let us rewrite the system as: 
)( fiff fnnn η=&                                                          (8)’’ 
)( fiff ngηηη =&                                                          (12)’’ 
Where: 
 [ ]mwuwuf iffff ρητηη −−−−= )1(])1[()(                                (14) 
])[1(])1[()( ewynwynng iifffff ψγ −−−−−−=                         (15) 
The equilibrium or steady state solution of the model is obtained by considering 
that: 0== ffn η&& . From expression (8)’’ we have three possibilities, namely: 0=fn , 
1=fn  or 0)( =ff η . From expression (12)’ we also have three possibilities, namely: 
0=fη , 1=fη  or 0)( =fng . Hence, from the combination of these possibilities we 
have the following possible solutions: (i) 0=fn , 0=fη ; (ii) 0=fn , 1=fη ; (iii) 
1=fn , 0=fη ; (iv) 1=fn , 1=fη ; (v) 0)( =ff η , 0)( =fng ; (vi)  0=fn , 0)( =fng ; 
(vii) 1=fn , 0)( =fng ; (viii) 0=fη , 0)( =ff η and (ix) 1=fη , 0)( =ff η . Let us 
exclude those equilibria in which the profits or utility function has to be equal to 0 to 
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hold. Consider for instance case (vi): if  0=fn  and 0)0( =g   then the profit of the firm 
in the informal sector is given by: 0=−− ewy ii ψ . Since the variables in this 
expression are exogenously given there is no reason a priori to assume that this relation 
holds. The same reasoning applies to cases (vii), (viii) and (ix). In order to provide a 
better characterization of the dynamics of the labor market let us use the Lyapunov 
theorem.  
According to Takeuchi (1996), the Lyapunov function for the system formed by 
(8)’’ to (14) around point (1,1) is properly given by: 
)ln()ln(),( 21
f
f
fff
f
f
fffff n
n
nnnnV
η
η
ηηηδδη −−+−−=                     (16) 
 Then we can prove the following: 
Proposition 1: 
If profits in formal and informal sectors are positive, namely ewy ii ψ>−  and 
ff wy >− )1( γ , then the dynamic system (8)’’ and (12)’’ is Lyapunov stable at (1,1) in 
the set A defined by: 








−+−
−
>
−−++−
−−
>×∈=
mww
mw
ewywy
ewy
nnA
if
i
f
iiff
ii
fff ργ
ρη
ψγ
ψη
)1(
,
)1(
];1,0[]1,0[),(  
Proof. 
The requirement a) of the Lyapunov theorem is easily satisfied at (1,1), namely 
0)1,1( =V . In order to prove condition b) it is sufficient to show that: 1ln >− ff nn  and 
1ln >− ff ηη  for all ),( ffn η  in a neighborhood Ω of (1,1). But this result holds for 
every 10 << fn  and 10 << fη . In order to prove c) let us take the time derivative of 
expression (16) which yields: 
f
f
ff
f
f
ff n
n
nn
V η
η
ηη
δδ &&
)()(
' 21
−
+
−
=                                     (17) 
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Substituting expressions (8)’’ and (12)’’ into the expression above we obtain: 
)()1(
)(
)()1(
)(
' 21 fff
f
ff
fff
f
ff ngfnn
n
nn
V ηη
η
ηη
δηδ −
−
+−
−
=        (18) 
After some algebraic manipulation and considering that )1,1(),( =ffn η   it is 
possible to show that the expression above may be written as:                
)()1()()1(' 22
2
1 ffff ngfnV ηδηδ −−−−=                                (19) 
Note that 0'<V  iff 0)( >ff η  and 0)( >fng . These conditions are satisfied iff 
mww
mw
if
i
f ργ
ρη
−+−
−
>
)1(
 and 
ewywy
ewy
n
iiff
ii
f ψγ
ψ
−−++−
−−
>
)1(
. Hence we have 
proved the global stability of the point (1,1). □ 
   This result shows that the equilibrium (1,1) is not only locally stable in the 
region defined by the set A but it is also Lyapunov stable. Then following the 
classification of Vega-Redondo (1996) it is possible to say that (1,1) is an 
asymptotically stable equilibrium of the dynamic system (8)’ and (12)’. In order to 
prove that the system is also asymptotically stable in (0,0) let us consider the following 
Lyapunov function suggested by Nani and Freedman (2000): 
2
2
2
1 )(2
1
)(
2
1
),( ffffff nnnV ηηδδη −+−=                            (20) 
 Then we can prove the following: 
Proposition 2: 
If ewy ii ψ>−  and ff wy >− )1( γ  then he dynamic system (8)’’ and (12)’’ is Lyapunov 
stable at (0,0) in the set B defined by: 








−+−
−
<
−−++−
−−
<×∈=
mww
mw
ewywy
ewy
nnB
if
i
f
iiff
ii
fff ργ
ρη
ψγ
ψη
)1(
,
)1(
];1,0[]1,0[),(  
Proof. 
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Note that 0)0,0( =V . Besides 0),( >ffnV η for all ]1,0[]1,0[),( ×∈ffn η  and 
)0,0(),( ≠ffn η . Taking the derivative of the Lyapunov function we conclude that:  
ffffff nnnV ηηηδδ && )()(' 21 −+−=                                          (21) 
Hence by substituting (8)’’ and (12)’’ into the expression above we obtain: 
)()1()()()1()(' 21 ffffffffff ngfnnnnV ηηηηδηδ −−+−−=                     (22) 
Note that 0'<V  iff 0)( <ff η  and 0)( <fng . These conditions are satisfied iff 
mww
mw
if
i
f ρτ
ρη
−+−
−
<
)1(
 and 
ewywy
ewy
n
iiff
ii
f ψγ
ψ
−−+−−
−−
<
)1(
. Hence we have 
proved the Lyapunov stability of the point (0,0) in the set B. □ 
Then it was also proven that the point (0,0) is an asymptotically stable 
equilibrium of the dynamical system (8)’ and (12)’. Note that these results – 
Propositions 1 and 2 – depend crucially on the assumptions made in relation to the 
profits of firms in the formal and informal sector.   
In this vein the dynamics of model is best suited to explain the growth 
experience of the labor market when it is assumed that the profits are positive and in 
this case by proving the local stability and the Lyapunov stability it was possible to 
prove that the equilibria in which firms and workers choose the formal sector or the 
informal sector are asymptotically stable equilibria of the dynamical system derived 
from an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market. 
 In this case the dynamic analysis of the model allows us to conclude for the 
existence of path dependence, namely the initial conditions play a decisive role in the 
determination of the configuration of the equilibrium in the labor market. According to 
Wirl and Feichtinger (2005, p. 391) path dependence in a one dimensional model means 
that there exists a threshold value such that the steady state outcome depends on 
whether one starts by historical incidence either to the left or the right of this threshold. 
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In the present treatment as we are dealing in the plane it is possible to identify not a 
threshold point but a threshold curve or set that defines sets that give rise to poverty 
traps. In the literature such a threshold set become known as Skiba threshold – or points 
or sets – in honor of the pioneering work of Skiba (1978). [see Deissenberg et al 
(2003)]. 
If for instance, ( ) Bn ff ∈)0(),0( η  then the final outcome of the model is the low 
level equilibrium (0,0) and the government can do nothing to change this situation. But 
the basin of attraction is affected by the choice of tax, fine and the probabilities of 
catching firms and workers in the informal sector. This means that the government is 
able to determine the size of the set B and consequently of set A – defined in the 
proposition 1 – by choosing properly these variables as policy tools but once they are 
chosen the model presents path dependency8. A similar result in terms of phase 
diagrams was obtained by Hiller (2010) by studying workers’ behavior and labour 
contracts in an evolutionary set up. He has found multiple equilibria with a saddle path 
interior solution and two unstable, namely (0,1) and (1,0), and two stable, namely (0,0) 
and (1,1) points. Besides the size of basin of attraction is affected by one of the 
parameters of the model and the final outcome of the model depends on the initial 
conditions which is evidence of path dependence.   
Another example is Vega-Redondo (1996, p.109) who considers an evolutionary 
model that exhibits trading complementariness similar to the one we consider here: 
populations of two separated islands may decide to be ‘employed’ or ‘unemployed’ and 
then they are matched in pairs. If occurs the matching of two employed individuals, 
they exchange their goods and they both have a positive utility. If two ‘unemployed’ 
                                                      
8 See Apendix II for an exposition of the phase diagrams that show a variation in the basins of attraction 
due to changes in the parameters of the model such as the taxation on wages and profits.    
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individuals are matched they have zero utility but if an ‘employed’ individual of one 
island matches an unemployed individual of the other island the ‘employed’ individual 
receives a negative pay-off since she has worked to produce the good but can neither 
consume nor exchange its good while the ‘unemployed’ worker has zero utility since it 
didn’t made any effort. The final outcome of this evolutionary game is that equilibria 
(0,0) and (1,1) in which populations of both islands chooses (employed, employed) or 
(unemployed, unemployed) are asymptotically evolutionary stable. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In order to modeling labor market evolution, in this paper we have adopted an 
evolutionary methodology, in which agents choices are evaluated, may it be workers or 
firms, considering the payoffs associated to each strategy: be formal or informal; and 
the mean payoff of the other agents. This methodology has yielded a system of 
differential equation which has multiple equilibria.  
We then have studied the local and Lyapunov stability of the differential system 
to show that both the equilibria in each all labor force and all firms operate in the formal 
sector and the case in which all the labor force and all firms operate in the informal 
sector are asymptotically stable. The former case is probably the situation that best 
describe developed economies in which the underground economy is negligible. The 
latter case may describe the case of some underdeveloped countries.  
The economic meaning of these results go beyond the findings that informality 
arises as the optimal response of workers and firms in response of rigid labor 
legislation, high taxes and deficient enforcement frameworks, results that are well 
established in the literature. The existence of multiple equilibria in the labor market 
points to a correspondence between the labor market and the stage of economic 
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development. It is also shown that the government plays a central role in the 
determination of mixed equilibria but the final position of a country depends on the 
initial position, that is, on the fraction of workers and firms that are skilled and operate 
in the formality respectively.  
 
Appendix I 
Proof of Proposition 1c: 
Another way of proving requirement c) of Proposition 1 is to show that (1,1) is a local 
maximum of the function V’. Note that V’(1,1)=0 and if we prove that V’ is definite 
negative then V’<0 for all points in a neighborhood Ω of (1,1). In order to show this let 
us rewrite expression (19) as: 
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Where we add and subtract 1 to fn  and fη  in order to evaluate the expression 
around the point (1,1). After some algebraic manipulation this expression reduces to: 
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Where '),( VnL ff =η . By taking the partial derivatives of the above expression in 
relation to fn and fη  we obtain: 
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It is important to note that (1,1) is a critical point of the function ),( ffnL η since 
0)1,1()1,1( ==
ff
LLn η . Besides, taking the second partial derivatives of  ),( ffnL η it is 
possible to conclude that: 
])1[(2]}[])1[(){1(2),( 11 fiffffnn wumwuwunL ff τδρτηδη −−−+−−=                         (24) 
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Evaluating the matrix Hessian at the point (1,1) it yields: 
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Thus 0])1[(2)1,1(det 11 <−−=Η fwu τδ  and 0][])1[(4)1,1(det 21 >−−−=Η ewywu iif ψδτδ  
provided that 0>−− ewy ii ψ , which is our assumption. The Hessian matrix is then 
shown to be definite negative at (1,1). Then it is possible to conclude that (1,1) is a local 
maximum of the function ),('),( ffff nVnL ηη = and since 0)1,1(')1,1( ==VL  then:  
0),(' <ffnV η  in a neighborhood Ω of (1,1) as we wanted to prove. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2c: 
Another way of proving requirement c) of Proposition 2 is to show that (0,0) is a local 
maximum of the function V’. Note that V’(0,0)=0 and if we prove that V’ is definite 
negative then V’<0 for all points in a neighborhood Ω of (0,0). By considering that 
)0,0(),( =ffn η  expression (22) reduces to: 
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Where '),( VnL ff =η . By taking the partial derivatives of the above expression in 
relation to fn and fη  we obtain: 
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Note that (0,0) is a critical point of the function L. By taking the second partial 
derivatives of L one obtains: 
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Evaluating the matrix Hessian at the point (0,0) it yields: 
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Thus 0][2)0,0(det 11 <−−=Η mwu i ρδ  and 0][][4)0,0(det 21 >−−−=Η ewymwu iii ψδρδ  
provided that 0>−− ewy ii ψ , which is our assumption. The Hessian matrix is then 
shown to be negative definite at (0,0). 
 
Appendix II 
The figures below show that the choice of the parameters of the model determines the 
size of the basin of attractions. In order to perform this analysis let us consider linear 
utility functions such as: ff wu )1( τ−=  and mwu ii ρ−= . The instantaneous profit 
functions are given by: fff wy −−= )1( γπ and ewy iii ψπ −−= . By choosing 2,0=τ ; 
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625,0=fw ; 6,0=iw ; 3=m ; 1,0=ρ ; 25,1=fy ; 1=iy  ; 3,0=iw ; 2,0=ψ ; 2,0=e  
and 18,0=γ we obtain: 5.0 and 8.0 ;3.0 ;5.0 ==== ifif uu ππ . In the second case let 
us change the values of taxations of wages and profits to 52,0=τ  and 18,0=γ  . This 
yields the following values for the utility and profit functions: 
5.0 and 4.0 ;3.0 ;3.0 ==== ifif uu ππ . In order to illustrate the path dependence issue 
let us consider the following initial conditions in the table below. The second and third 
line of the table show the final position of each initial condition. Note that in the first 
case the number of equilibria (1,1) is larger than (0,0). This case is related to smaller 
taxation of the formal sector. In case II equilibrium (0,0) is ubiquous as the final 
outcome indicating that a higher taxation may induce to the low income equilibrium.  
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black 
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red 
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green 
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brown 
3,0)0(
56,0)0(
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maroon 
7,0)0(
7,0)0(
=
=
f
fn
η
blue 
Case I (1,1) (1,1) (1,1) (0,0) (0,0) (1,1) (1,1) 
Case II (0,0) (1,1) (1,1) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (1,1) 
Table I: 
 
 
 
Figure 1: 
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